











realized	  democratization	  of	  the	  regime.	  The	  third	  section	  looks	  at	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  changing	  structural	  and	  institutional	  environments	  of	  foreign	  policy	  for	  Itamaraty’s	  monopoly	  over	  the	  means	  of	  diplomacy,	  especially	  in	  recent	  years.	  It	  illustrates	  the	  main	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  dynamics	  have	  weakened	  the	  relative	  position	  of	  Itamaraty	  in	  Brazil's	  foreign	  policy	  regime,	  and	  its	  grip	  over	  the	  country’s	  external	  engagement.	  	  	  Given	  its	  scope,	  this	  chapter	  is	  by	  necessity	  somewhat	  impressionistic.	  It	  relies	  on	  relatively	  few	  key	  examples	  but	  we	  feel	  that	  they	  clearly	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  structural	  constraints	  and	  freedoms	  linked	  to	  the	  country’s	  changing	  global	  strategic	  and	  economic	  insertion	  have	  played	  out	  very	  concretely	  in	  everyday	  foreign	  policy-­‐making,	  affecting	  both	  the	  scope	  of	  interests	  it	  represents,	  and	  the	  range	  of	  actors	  that	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  it.	  	  	  




engagement	  sometimes	  results,	  creating	  democratic	  "moments."	  For	  most	  countries,	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  such	  moments	  are	  rare	  and	  foreign	  policy	  remains	  a	  side	  issue,	  the	  preserve	  of	  specialists	  and	  of	  special	  interests	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  particularly	  democratic	  policy	  field.	  This	  also	  stems	  in	  part	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  discussions	  and	  expertise	  involved	  are	  often	  esoteric,	  making	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  policies	  debated	  unclear	  for	  social	  interests	  and	  engagement,	  direct	  or	  indirect,	  less	  likely.	  Foreign	  policy	  making	  also	  usually	  takes	  place	  in	  spaces,	  physical	  or	  virtual,	  that	  are	  not	  truly	  open	  and	  whose	  access	  is	  in	  fact	  typically	  restricted.	  	  	  In	  other	  words,	  foreign	  policy	  making	  is	  usually	  oligarchic,	  conforming	  to	  a	  policy	  regime	  where	  all	  interests	  are	  not	  submitted	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  uncertainty,	  even	  in	  well-­‐established	  democracies	  (Daudelin,	  1995).	  The	  one	  major	  exception	  among	  significant	  international	  players	  is	  probably	  the	  United	  States,	  where	  Congress	  and	  the	  President,	  for	  good	  or	  ill,	  regularly	  engages	  in	  very	  public	  foreign	  policy	  debates	  that	  reverberate	  widely	  through	  the	  media,	  and	  where	  a	  range	  of	  interest	  groups	  feed	  a	  lively	  and	  broadly-­‐based	  discussion	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  The	  situation	  in	  Brazil,	  by	  contrast,	  is	  much	  more	  typical	  of	  the	  general	  trend.	  As	  table	  1	  makes	  clear-­‐-­‐and	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  details	  in	  the	  next	  section-­‐-­‐a	  number	  of	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  country’s	  foreign	  policy	  or	  in	  policies	  that	  profoundly	  affect	  its	  global	  insertion	  (e.g.	  trade	  liberalization)	  have	  taken	  place	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s	  without	  the	  issue	  ever	  becoming	  electoral	  themes,	  without	  broad-­‐based	  formal	  public	  consultations,	  with	  limited	  Congressional	  inputs,	  and	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  broad	  public	  debate.	  Even	  in	  those	  rare	  instances	  where	  open	  public	  consultation	  does	  take	  place,	  the	  foreign	  policy	  elite,	  and	  Itamaraty	  in	  particular,	  keep	  close	  control	  on	  the	  process.	  This	  was	  demonstrated	  during	  the	  2014	  public	  consultations	  foreign	  minister	  Luiz	  Alberto	  Figueiredo	  Machado	  called	  for	  inputs	  on	  a	  possible	  foreign	  policy	  ‘white	  paper’.	  Tellingly,	  the	  public	  presentations	  and	  discussions	  were	  conducted	  in	  the	  large	  formal	  meeting	  halls	  of	  the	  Itamaraty	  Palace	  in	  Brasília,	  not	  in	  regional	  centres	  away	  from	  the	  capital.	  	  Table	  1	  	  













Unilateral	  trade	  liberalization	   1989-­‐1990,	  Fernando	  Collor	  de	  Melo	  
No	   No	   No	   Yes	  
Establishment	  of	  Mercosul	   1993,	  Itamar	  Franco	   No	   No	   Yes	   Limited	  Signature	  of	  the	  Non-­‐Proliferation	  Treaty	  
1996,	  Fernando	  Henrique	  Cardoso	  
No	   No	   Yes	   Limited	  
Opposition	  to	  the	  FTAA	   1994-­‐2000,	  Itamar	  Franco,	  Fernando	  Henrique	  Cardoso	  
No	   Limited	   No	   Limited	  
South	  American	  “pivot”	  (first	  South	  American	  Presidential	  Summit)	  
2000,	  Fernando	  Henrique	  Cardoso	  
No	   No	   No	   Limited	  
Southern	  “pivot”	  (major	  investment	  in	  relations	  with	  Africa	  and	  Asia)	  
2003-­‐2006,	  Luiz	  Inacio	  Lula	  da	  Silva	  
No	   No	   No	   Limited	  
Establishment	  of	  the	  India-­‐Brazil-­‐South	  Africa	  Forum	  
2003,	  Luiz	  Inacio	  Lula	  da	  Silva	  
No	   No	   No	   No	  
Market	  economy	  recognition	  of	  China	  
2004,	  Luiz	  Inácio	  Lula	  da	  Silva	  
No	   No	   Limited	   Limited	  
Establishment	  of	  UNASUR	   2004,	  Luiz	  Inacio	  Lula	  da	  Silva	  
No	   No	   No	   Limited	  
Involvement	  of	  Brazil	  (with	  Turkey)	  in	  defense	  of	  
2007,	  Luiz	  Inacio	  Lula	  da	  Silva	  




Iran’s	  right	  to	  develop	  civilian	  nuclear	  program	  Brazilian	  support	  for	  the	  admission	  of	  Venezuela	  in	  Mercosul	  
2006,	  Luiz	  Inacio	  Lula	  da	  Silva	  
No	   No	   Limited	   Limited	  
Creation	  of	  the	  Community	  of	  Latin	  American	  and	  Caribbean	  States	  (CELAC)	  
2010,	  Luiz	  Inacio	  Lula	  da	  Silva	  
No	   No	   No	   Limited	  




	  Second,	  the	  monopoly	  of	  the	  means	  of	  diplomacy	  is	  but	  one	  possibility	  on	  a	  whole	  continuum	  of	  concentration	  of	  control	  over	  foreign	  policy	  development	  and	  implementation,	  and	  a	  priori,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  an	  authoritarian	  policy	  regime	  is	  necessarily	  monopolistic,	  or	  that	  a	  democratic	  one	  necessarily	  involves	  a	  fragmentation	  of	  policy	  praxis.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  while	  many	  dictators	  are	  fond	  of	  foreign	  travels	  and	  activism,	  diplomats	  and	  foreign	  ministers	  often	  play	  important	  roles	  along	  state	  leaders	  in	  very	  closed	  regimes:	  think	  for	  instance	  of	  Andrei	  Gromiko,	  who	  led	  the	  the	  USSR’s	  Ministry	  of	  foreign	  affairs	  between	  1957	  and	  1985,	  for	  instance.	  Conversely,	  extensive	  engagement	  around	  foreign	  policy	  decisions	  can	  take	  place	  while	  policy	  formulation	  and	  implementation,	  including	  complete	  control	  over	  international	  negotiations,	  remain	  firmly	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  diplomatic	  corp.	  	  	  These	  two	  parameters—democracy	  and	  monopoly—could	  be	  combined	  to	  create	  a	  two-­‐dimensional	  matrix	  that	  defines	  four	  ideal-­‐types	  of	  policy	  regimes.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  simplicity	  we	  will	  look	  at	  each	  of	  them	  separately	  here,	  assessing	  a	  policy	  regimes’	  democratic	  character,	  and	  the	  location	  and	  degree	  of	  concentration	  of	  institutional	  control	  over	  it.	  We	  then	  organize	  and	  classify	  a	  few	  key	  policy	  “moments”	  of	  recent	  years	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  social	  and	  political	  engagement	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  fragmentation	  of	  policy-­‐making	  that	  they	  involved.	  	  








	  	  	  	  	  Brazil’s	  economic	  health	  depends	  in	  part	  on	  access	  to	  foreign	  markets	  for	  its	  products.	  That	  dependence	  has	  been	  increasing	  in	  recent	  years,	  but	  at	  just	  27%	  of	  GDP	  it	  is	  still	  very	  small	  by	  global	  standards	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  Moreover,	  Brazil’s	  import	  and	  export	  matrix	  have	  become	  remarkably	  balanced	  with,	  on	  average	  for	  the	  last	  decade,	  about	  a	  fifth	  each	  in	  Latin	  America,	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  EU	  and	  China.	  Finally,	  a	  significant—and	  increasing—proportion	  of	  its	  exports	  are	  made	  up	  of	  primary	  goods,	  both	  minerals	  and	  agricultural	  commodities,	  whose	  prices	  have	  been	  at	  historical	  highs	  over	  the	  last	  decade	  and,	  in	  spite	  of	  recent	  declines	  for	  some	  of	  them,	  retain	  very	  good	  long	  term	  prospects	  (Veiga,	  2007).	  	  	  	  Figure	  2	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  Access	  to	  capital	  is	  similarly	  unproblematic.	  Domestic	  investment	  is	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  state-­‐driven	  and	  significant	  in	  scale	  (see	  Armijo	  in	  this	  book;	  Hochstetler	  and	  Montero,	  2013).	  The	  size	  of	  an	  internal	  market	  that	  social	  reforms	  have	  deepened,	  the	  relative	  stability	  of	  Brazil’s	  economy,	  and	  the	  potential	  of	  its	  primary	  goods	  export	  sector	  make	  the	  country	  a	  magnet	  for	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  private	  investment	  (Brainard	  and	  Martinez-­‐Diaz,	  2009).	  Furthermore,	  sound	  and	  relatively	  prudent	  economic	  policy	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  have	  drastically	  reduced	  the	  views	  and	  priorities	  of	  both	  rich	  countries’	  treasuries	  and	  international	  financial	  institutions	  in	  the	  calculations	  of	  Brazilian	  decision-­‐makers,	  which	  they	  used	  to	  haunt.	  Brazil’s	  economy	  is	  not	  recession-­‐proof	  or	  immune	  from	  external	  shocks,	  but	  its	  fate	  is	  truly	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  its	  own	  government.	  Lastly,	  while	  Brazilian	  companies	  have	  lately	  become	  quite	  active	  on	  global	  markets,	  these	  activities	  have	  been	  dominated	  by	  a	  small	  number	  of	  firms	  such	  as	  mining	  giant	  Vale	  and	  construction	  combines	  like	  Odebrecht,	  which	  often	  finance	  their	  operations	  with	  internal	  resources	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  have	  been	  earned	  and	  held	  outside	  of	  Brazil.	  Moreover,	  the	  size	  of	  these	  holdings	  remain	  relatively	  small	  when	  put	  in	  a	  global	  context	  and	  they	  are	  of	  minor	  importance	  to	  the	  country’s	  economic	  performance	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  	  	  Figure	  3	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  In	  sum,	  Brazil’s	  peculiar	  and	  privileged	  insertion	  in	  the	  global	  strategic	  and	  political	  economies,	  anchored	  on	  relatively	  inelastic	  global	  mineral	  and	  agricultural	  export	  demand,	  makes	  foreign	  policy	  largely	  irrelevant	  to	  its	  economic	  stability	  and	  strategic	  safety.	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on	  their	  own,	  largely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  momentum	  in	  the	  US,	  epitomized	  by	  the	  thorny	  political	  debates	  around	  the	  annual	  US	  farm	  bill	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  ‘fast	  track’	  negotiating	  authority.	  Itamaraty	  implemented	  the	  policy,	  but	  the	  strategic	  direction	  and	  rationale	  was	  heavily	  influenced,	  if	  not	  directed,	  by	  the	  presidency	  and	  the	  country’s	  emerging	  internationally-­‐oriented	  industrial	  sector	  (Magalhães,	  1999;	  Barbosa,	  2011;	  Lampreia,	  2010).	  	  Brazil’s	  deliberate	  turn	  towards	  Africa	  and	  the	  global	  South,	  during	  the	  Lula	  years,	  followed	  a	  similar	  path.	  While	  traditionally	  US-­‐	  and	  Europe-­‐centred	  sectors	  in	  Itamaraty	  and	  mainstream	  business	  elites	  saw	  the	  attention	  given	  to	  Africa	  and	  South	  America	  as	  an	  ideological	  extravagance	  that	  would	  fundamentally	  damage	  Brazil’s	  core	  interests	  (Cabral,	  2007),	  the	  response	  from	  Brazil’s	  empreiteiras	  was	  one	  of	  delight.	  Trade	  with	  Africa	  is	  marginal,	  barely	  moving	  from	  4.7%	  of	  Brazil’s	  total	  trade	  in	  2002	  to	  5.7%	  in	  2012,	  or	  $26.5	  billion	  for	  the	  entire	  continent.	  Yet,	  this	  trade	  was	  highly	  concentrated	  in	  specific	  industrial	  sectors	  and	  underpinned	  by	  large	  investments	  from	  a	  small	  group	  of	  major	  resource	  and	  construction	  companies.	  Activities	  that	  the	  empreiteiras	  had	  been	  quietly	  undertaking	  in	  Africa	  and	  South	  America	  from	  the	  early-­‐1990s,	  such	  as	  Odebrecht’s	  large	  infrastructure	  projects	  in	  Angola,	  mushroomed	  in	  the	  2000s,	  benefiting	  considerably	  from	  Lula’s	  developing	  rock-­‐star	  status	  in	  the	  global	  South.	  Parallel	  gains	  were	  made	  by	  companies	  like	  mining	  giant	  Vale,	  oil	  company	  Petrobras	  and	  electricity	  utility	  Eletrobras,	  all	  of	  whom	  engaged	  in	  a	  series	  of	  major	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  operations	  across	  the	  southern	  hemisphere:	  the	  empreiteiras	  won	  several	  billion	  dollar	  contracts	  for	  infrastructure	  projects	  such	  as	  airports,	  subway	  systems,	  ports,	  and	  hydroelectric	  dams	  –	  Odebrecht’s	  global	  revenues	  in	  2013	  topped	  US$	  40	  billion	  –	  and	  Petrobras	  and	  Vale	  opened	  major	  new	  resource	  extraction	  operations,	  a	  notable	  example	  being	  Vale’s	  $6	  billion	  (and	  growing)	  cash	  investment	  in	  the	  Moatize	  coal	  mine	  in	  Mozambique.	  	  	  The	  Mozambique	  case	  highlights	  how	  the	  economic	  logic	  of	  the	  policy	  shift	  to	  Africa	  was	  tied	  to	  the	  outlook	  and	  interests	  of	  a	  small	  group	  rather	  than	  to	  wider	  societal	  interests	  or	  to	  the	  views	  of	  traditional	  elites.	  Just	  as	  Vale	  was	  ramping	  up	  its	  investment	  in	  Moatize	  and	  pulling	  in	  a	  string	  of	  empreiteiras	  to	  undertake	  the	  needed	  infrastructure	  construction,	  the	  leading	  Brazilian	  newspaper	  O	  Estado	  de	  




passing	  fancy	  (Dávila,	  2010).	  Lost	  in	  this	  geopolitical	  focus	  were	  the	  economic	  interests	  of	  Brazil’s	  empreiteiras,	  manufacturers	  and	  resource	  extraction	  companies,	  all	  of	  whom,	  thanks	  to	  state	  support,	  had	  larger	  opportunities	  in	  South	  America	  and	  Africa	  than	  in	  the	  more	  competitive	  markets	  of	  the	  US	  and	  EU.	  Although	  it	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  a	  ‘democratizing’	  process	  because	  foreign	  policy	  was	  redirected	  in	  response	  to	  demands	  from	  a	  slightly	  wider	  interest	  segment	  within	  Brazil,	  the	  regime	  in	  the	  end	  remained	  very	  much	  oligarchic.	  	  
A	  Monopoly	  Challenged:	  Climbing	  over	  the	  Palace	  Walls	  	  Aside	  from	  a	  limited	  movement	  towards	  democracy,	  the	  involvement	  of	  new	  actors	  and	  the	  challenge	  they	  represent	  for	  Itamaraty’s	  traditional	  monopoly	  over	  the	  means	  of	  diplomacy	  represents	  a	  critical	  change	  in	  Brazil’s	  foreign	  policy	  regime.	  We	  trace	  this	  second	  mutation	  to	  three	  main	  factors:	  the	  increased	  technical	  requirements	  of	  international	  engagement,	  particularly	  on	  trade	  and	  economic	  issues,	  which	  strains	  the	  capacities	  of	  a	  diplomatic	  corps	  that	  consists	  mostly	  of	  generalists;	  the	  weak	  institutionalization	  of	  the	  country’s	  preferred	  multilateral	  channels	  of	  diplomacy	  (from	  Mercosul	  on),	  which	  leaves	  diplomats	  with	  few	  means	  to	  manage	  on	  their	  own	  important	  problems	  that	  arise	  in	  the	  country’s	  foreign	  relations	  and	  forcing	  them	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  President;	  and	  the	  growing	  if	  still	  episodic	  political	  appeal	  of	  foreign	  policy,	  which	  acts	  like	  a	  honey	  pot	  for	  politicians,	  particularly	  presidents.	  It	  must	  be	  emphasized,	  however,	  that	  without	  the	  structural	  push	  that	  deep	  economic	  or	  strategic	  insertion	  would	  provide,	  these	  dynamics	  have	  had	  a	  limited	  impact:	  in	  the	  end,	  Itamaraty	  remains	  very	  much	  in	  charge.	  	  	  








for,	  not	  expertise	  in	  trade	  law	  or	  agricultural	  economics.	  As	  global	  trade	  discussions	  heat	  up	  again,	  however,	  such	  status-­‐saving	  situations	  may	  become	  scarce.	  	  Encroachments	  by	  technical	  experts	  on	  Itamaraty’s	  monopoly	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  other	  areas	  such	  as	  health,	  human	  rights	  and	  culture	  (Pinheiro	  and	  Milani,	  2012).	  Compared	  to	  trade	  and	  economic	  issues,	  however,	  their	  relative	  marginality	  in	  international	  policy	  discussions	  and	  Brazil's	  limited	  global	  profile	  in	  these	  areas	  have	  limited	  their	  impact	  on	  Itamaraty	  control	  over	  the	  country's	  diplomacy.	  	  	  








represent	  little	  more	  than	  vehicles	  for	  periodic	  meetings	  of	  heads	  of	  states.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  recently	  created	  BRICS	  development	  bank	  will	  have	  a	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  remains	  unsettled,	  but	  there	  are	  few	  indications	  that	  its	  formal	  leaders	  will	  benefit	  from	  even	  as	  short	  a	  leash	  as	  those	  given	  to	  the	  presidents	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  IMF.	  Finally,	  Brazil's	  keen	  support	  for	  the	  summit	  diplomacy	  that	  has	  typified	  the	  last	  decade	  takes	  that	  anti-­‐institutional	  trait	  to	  its	  extreme.	  Summits	  –	  Ibero-­‐American,	  Arab-­‐Latin	  American,	  Brazil-­‐Africa,	  Africa-­‐South	  America	  –	  are	  indeed	  best	  seen	  as	  portable	  tents	  meant	  strictly	  for	  dialogues	  between	  chief	  executives.	  	  The	  institutional	  deficit	  in	  Brazil's	  favoured	  form	  of	  multilateralism	  only	  makes	  sense	  for	  a	  country	  that	  has	  little	  need	  or	  will	  for	  sustained	  collective	  engagement	  and	  effective	  long-­‐term	  supra-­‐national	  governance.	  It	  creates	  a	  capacity	  gap	  at	  the	  international	  level,	  however,	  that	  makes	  Presidential	  engagement	  necessary	  for	  concerted	  action	  (Burges	  and	  Daudelin,	  2011).	  To	  that	  extent,	  it	  opens	  the	  door	  to	  episodic	  challenges	  to	  Itamaraty's	  monopoly,	  especially	  when	  the	  President,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  Lula,	  finds	  significant	  political	  benefits	  in	  global	  engagements.	  	  




"serious"	  media's	  early	  insistence	  on	  correcting	  his	  often	  tortured	  Portuguese,	  was	  replaced	  by	  a	  generic	  pride	  at	  the	  image	  of	  Brazil,	  modern,	  democratic	  and	  open,	  that	  he	  successfully	  projected	  in	  the	  world.	  For	  the	  poor,	  his	  international	  success	  neatly	  complemented	  the	  self-­‐esteem	  effect	  that	  his	  election	  had	  created	  (Burges,	  2005).	  	  	  These	  peculiar	  reasons	  no	  doubt	  reinforced	  Lula's	  successful	  claim	  over	  the	  country's	  diplomacy.	  They	  were,	  however,	  probably	  peculiar	  to	  his	  mandates	  and	  to	  the	  normalization	  of	  Brazil’s	  international	  status,	  following	  the	  stabilization	  of	  its	  economy.	  It	  is	  indeed	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  his	  successors	  drawing	  much	  political	  capital	  from	  an	  active	  international	  agenda,	  which	  may	  explain	  Dilma	  Rousseff's	  retreat	  into	  the	  domestic	  realm,	  above	  and	  beyond	  her	  lack	  of	  charisma	  and	  the	  somewhat	  bland	  nature,	  compared	  to	  Lula,	  of	  her	  political	  trajectory.	  	  The	  Golden	  Age	  of	  Presidential	  Diplomacy,	  in	  other	  words,	  may	  well	  be	  gone.	  With	  little	  prospect	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  country’s	  strategic	  and	  economic	  environment,	  Brazilian	  foreign	  policy's	  substantive	  relevance	  for	  domestic	  politics	  is	  unlikely	  to	  increase	  much	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  kind	  of	  transformation	  of	  Brazil’s	  symbolic	  status	  that	  happened	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  Century	  is	  also	  probably	  a	  unique	  event.	  The	  challenge	  to	  Itamaraty's	  monopoly	  represented	  by	  presidential	  diplomacy,	  in	  other	  words,	  probably	  lies	  mostly	  in	  the	  technical	  turn	  of	  global	  affairs	  and	  in	  the	  thin	  institutionalization	  of	  Brazil's	  multilateral	  engagement	  in	  the	  world.	  	  	  




foreign	  policy,	  representing	  less	  an	  effective	  democratization	  of	  that	  policy	  regime	  than	  the	  multiplication	  of	  democratic	  moments	  that	  see	  foreign	  policy	  more	  broadly	  debated;	  and	  a	  limited	  challenge	  to	  the	  monopoly	  of	  Itamaraty	  over	  the	  means	  of	  diplomacy,	  with	  the	  growing	  involvement	  of	  new	  actors,	  particularly	  outside	  specialists	  and	  the	  country’s	  Presidents.	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